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Abstract
This contribution focuses on the social production and reproduction of social inequalities in Brazil and South Africa. It aims at inter-
linking different theoretical perspectives and applying them to a comparative analysis of inequality-related policies. Resorting to stra-
tegic-relational institutionalism, the historical heritage of discourse formation and the institutionalization of inequality regimes in the
two countries to inform the analysis of the more recent conjuncture will be analysed. While South Africa is an example of formal racist
discrimination, the Brazilian inequality regime worked on more informal patterns. The different historical heritage influences current
foci of equality-related policies, which tend to be dominantly anti-racist in South Africa, while focusing on poverty reduction in Brazil
during the recent years. The latter experience tended more towards a discourse of a ‘common interest’ and was better able to institu-
tionalize policies to reduce income inequalities. South Africa is still discursively divided into ‘two nations’. Social uplifting for Africans
linked to the governing parties was only partially accompanied by improved living conditions for the poor majority of Africans. Both
countries are significantly structured by the respective historical heritage concerning both the creation and the reduction of inequali-
ties. The Brazilian ‘one nation’ discourse was more successful in promoting equality-related policies than its ‘two nations’ counterpart
in South Africa. Despite important improvements, both countries are now in critical junctures and societal contradictions are begin-
ning to create new crisis tendencies.
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I. Introduction1
This contribution focuses on the social production and reproduction of so-cial inequalities, aiming at interlinking different theoretical perspec-tives2. In the terms of the dimensions introduced by Lamont, Beljean and
Clair (2014), it focuses on material, symbolic and cultural inequalities. While
the former two forms rather focus on the macro-level and deeply rooted (struc-
tural) forms of inequalities, cultural processes of identification and rationaliza-
tion center on complex linkages between dominant and subordinate actors.
Lamont et al. (idem) criticize a latent determinism in analyses of material and
symbolic inequalities which might be avoided by cultural approaches focusing
on the micro-level. Without going much into detail on this discussion, this con-
tribution is departing from a macro-level historical institutionalist perspective
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003) and attempts to link the dimensions of mate-
rial, symbolic and cultural inequalities. Differing from individualistic perspec-
tives, this contribution focuses on horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2002): the
formation of collective identities, based on class, race and ethnicity, and the re-
spective material, symbolic and cultural inequalities, will be the point of depar-
ture3.
Thereby, shortcomings in the existing comparative historical institutionalist
literature on Brazil and South Africa will be addressed: the widely proliferated
work of Anthony W. Marx (2006) focuses on the question of racial identities
and racism in Brazil, South Africa and the US. Due to the ‘myth of racial de-
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2 This contribution was writ-
ten within the International
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Center for Development and
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3 The literature on different
and intersecting forms of ine-
qualities (e.g. Andersen & Hill
Collins 2003; Walby 2009)
would suggest to include at
least the further dimension of
mocracy’ in Brazil (to be shortly described afterwards), perspectives for anti-
racist policies are described as far more difficult than in South Africa. While
generally agreeing with Marx’s analysis, this contribution further highlights the
question of redistribution, being fundamentally linked to issues of class in-
equalities and poverty. The latter issues have been dealt with by Lieberman
(2001) in his comparison of Brazilian and South African tax policies. Focusing
on the formation of different ‘National Political Communities’ (NPCs),
Lieberman argues that South African ‘elites’ agreed to form a comparably
united NPC, while Brazilian ‘elites’ did not succeed in obtaining a comparable
unity among themselves. Lieberman argues that this resulted in differing ways
in which race and class were addressed in the 1891 Brazilian constitution and
the 1909 South Africa Act, which in turn affected the willingness of upper-in-
come groups to accept state demands for income tax payments. He concludes
that ‘low-income blacks in South Africa benefit from the progressive income
tax that was developed in the wake of this history of deliberate racial exclusion.
By contrast, their poor, black Brazilian counterparts continue to face a far more
regressive tax system’ (idem, p.547). While Marx focuses on racism,
Lieberman includes questions of class and social status. Nevertheless, his focus
is mostly on ‘elites’ and the most formal political institutions. Identity forma-
tion of the marginalized groups remains opaque and institutions beyond the
constitutions are only marginally considered.
Both authors argue that the historical-institutional heritage of the two coun-
tries favor equality-related policies in South Africa. More recent empirical find-
ings do not support this point of view: South African indicators showed rising
income inequalities since the end of apartheid (1994), from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.7
in 2000 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010, p.32), peaking at 0.72 in 2006, after which the
Gini coefficient dropped slightly to 0.7 in 2009 and 0.69 in 2011 (SSA 2014,
p.14). While general inequalities were rising, intra-racial inequalities dropped
slightly (Seekings & Nattrass 2005). In Brazil, the picture differed significantly:
while intra-racial inequalities also dropped slightly, general inequalities
dropped significantly, especially in the 2000s: after slight declines during the
1990s (the Gini dropping from 0.6 in 1993 to 0.59 in 1999), the Gini coefficient
constantly improved during the 2000s, to 0.56 in 2006 with further drops to 0.54
in 2009 and 0.53 in 2011 and 2012 (IPEA 2015). As both countries have been
governed by parties linked to the trade union movement and devoted to the re-
duction of inequalities, it is of special interest why income inequalities have
been reduced to a much greater degree in Brazil than in South Africa4.
II. Methodology: Strategic-Relational Institutionalism
This article does not engage in a quantitative impact analysis, but rather fol-
lows a similar path to Marx’s (2006) and Lieberman’s (2001) historical
institutionalist accounts. Differing from Marx, it goes beyond the issue of rac-
ism and engages with a wider range of equality-oriented policies (Graser 2009)
– mainly combining a power-distributional approach towards the political econ-
omy and social policies (Leubolt 2013, inspired by Esping-Andersen 1990)
with an analysis of affirmative action policies. The approach towards the cul-
tural dimension will be similar to Lieberman’s account of the National Political
Community (Lieberman 2001), but differing in the aspect of the considered
identities which will go beyond the ‘elite-community’, but will also consider
subaltern identities. To limit the scope of the article, not all subaltern identities
will be focused. In line with the literature, the vertical dimension of inequalities
will focus on the interplay of race and class (Hamilton et al., 2001). The dealing
with the question of culture is guided by the ASID-approach (Moulaert &
Jessop 2013; Novy et al., 2013) and the strategic-relational approach (Jessop
2007) with important inspirations by the Latin American traditions of
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4 A more nuanced discussion
of indicators of inequality,
poverty and wellbeing is be-
yond the scope of this article.
It is important to note, that
South Africa has witnessed
fierce debates about the qual-
ity and validity of inequality
indicators during the 2000s
(cf. Meth 2008).
structuralism (Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Furtado 2007) and conjunctural analy-
sis (Fiori 1995; Souza 2002).
The thereby resulting approach will be labeled here as ‘strategic-relational
institutionalism’: the historical roots of discursive constructions of inequality
and equality will be considered in respect to their influences on the (in)equal-
ity-related institutions5. The analysis of the historical heritage will be guided by
periodization: methodologically, periodization will be employed to sequence
historical events viewed as essential for the structuring of inequality regimes in
Brazil and South Africa. Differing from a chronology, which orders actions,
events or periods on a single unilinear time scale, a periodization operates with
several time scales, resulting in differing conjunctures for the actions of the in-
volved social forces with decisive turning points, marked by crises (Jessop
2002).
Two different forms of periodization will be employed: the historical roots
of the production and reproduction of inequalities will be traced back by a
periodization similar to the longue durée employed by the Annales-school of
historical writing. The version employed in this article is mainly influenced by
Latin American structuralism (Cardoso & Faletto 1979; Furtado 2007) and the
regulation approach (Boyer & Saillard 1995). It will distinguish larger periods
of relatively stable patterns of development, which are divided by profound
economic, political and cultural crises. These crises are understood as important
periods of rupture, which are opening new paths, albeit ‘path dependencies’
(Ghezzi & Mingione 2007, chapter 3) still remain, as important features of the
periods before the crises remain in the new periods. The historical periods iden-
tified in chapter 3 will serve as a framework for a more fine-tuned periodization
presented in the preceding chapters. Influenced by theoretical currents succeed-
ing Marx’s ‘18th Brumaire’, such as Jessop (2002), the Latin American tradition
of conjunctural analysis (Fiori 1995; Souza 2002) and the South African
Poulantzian (Poulantzas 1974) current of periodization (Davies et al., 1976;
Wolpe 1990), the situation since the establishment of democracies will be ana-
lyzed. Similar to the approaches presented by Fiori (1995) and Cardoso and
Faletto (1979), the primary focus will be on the national contexts of Brazil and
South Africa, with brief acknowledgement of their insertion into the global po-
litical economy. By exploring the historical roots of the inequality regimes and
equality-oriented discourses, the context-specifics of the two analyzed cases
will be uncovered.
Special emphasis will be given to the notion of ‘one-nation’ and ‘two-na-
tions-projects’: Disraeli (2010) originally developed the notion of ‘two nations’
in 1845 for the analysis of British Victorian politics. His description of the situa-
tion of the British working class of these times can easily be used for the state of
marginalization and exclusion of large parts of the population until today
(Enriques 2007). In Disraeli’s novel, a central character states “that an impass-
able gulf divided the Rich from the Poor; I was told that the Privileged and the
People formed Two Nations, governed by different laws, influenced by differ-
ent manners, with no thoughts or sympathies in common; with an innate inabil-
ity of mutual comprehension”. The resulting exclusionary state project has been
termed a ‘two-nations project’ by Jessop et al. (1988) in their analysis of
Thatcherism and has already been applied to the cases of South Africa (Ansell
2004; Nattrass & Seekings 2001) and Brazil (Leubolt 2013). In contrast, a
‘one-nation project’ would envision a more universal notion of ‘social citizen-
ship’ (Marshall 1950), avoiding exclusion by promoting universalizing cul-
tural, political and social rights. This analysis will distinguish between a
universalizing discourse and actually existing institutions to better capture the
difference between formal and informal exclusion in South Africa and Brazil.
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5 The main focus of this con-
tribution will be on discourse.
More in-depth institutional
analyses have been published
elsewhere (Leubolt 2013;
2014a; 2014b; 2015). Their
explicit consideration would
go beyond the scope of a sin-
gle article.
III. Similar inequalities, differing historical roots
South Africa and Brazil are both marked by comparably high rates of
inequalities which have a strong racial connotation, linked to influences of colo-
nialism (Hall & Gay 1996). Nevertheless, colonial influences were institution-
alized differently: throughout the colonial history of both countries, mainly
Africans had to do the hard physical labor. While they were shipped to Brazil as
slaves from the 16th century until the end of the 19th century, the patterns of labor
exploitation were different in South Africa: the Dutch colonizers established a
system of settler colonialism, which resulted in (often violent) land conflicts,
but resorted to African labor power to a much lesser degree than the Brazilian
slavery-based economy. Therefore, inter-racial relationships in South Africa
have always been much more distant and racial differences hardly ever began to
blur, as it happened in Brazil, where a peculiar system of informal hierarchies
differentiated slaves and their owners, who lived in close proximity, but never-
theless clearly distinguished from each other (Freyre 1992; Marx 2006).
In contrast, the roots of the apartheid system of institutionalized racism and
racial separation can be traced back to settler colonialism, where the Dutch
viewed themselves as ‘the white tribe of Africa’ and clearly separated from
other African tribes (Louw 2004). Capitalism began to develop dynamically af-
ter gold was found in the mid-19th century. Mining capital was predominantly
British. New ethnic hierarchies began to form, as the British established them-
selves as hegemonic group, while the Dutch were lagging behind and increas-
ingly proletarized. Land conflicts between these groups further fuelled the
tensions which led to the Anglo-Boer Wars by the end of the 19th century. The
British won the second decisive war and began to construct a state geared to
serve the interests of mining capital, which primarily needed cheap supply of la-
bor and land (Louw 2004; Terreblanche 2002). The loss of land ownership fu-
elled a process of proletarization of both Dutch and Africans. The latter were
further forced by legislation to work as migrant workers to ensure a constant in-
flow of relatively cheap labor supply (Wolpe 1980)6. The Dutch resisted this
treatment and searched for unity on the bases of both class and race. Dutch re-
bellion culminated in the Rand revolt in 1922, when a general strike led by
Dutch-dominated workers’ organizations (under the slogan ‘workers unite for a
white South Africa’) paralyzed the country. To maintain political stability of co-
lonial rule, the British began to integrate important Dutch political leaders into
government and began to implement racist social and labor market policies in
favor of the Dutch. Race thereby became the central political category for creat-
ing unity in the power bloc (Beinart 2001). Exclusion was carried out on a for-
mal basis, fostering a racist discourse of a ‘two nations project’, separating
‘black’ and ‘white’ (Leubolt 2009). Inclusion was mainly concerned with the
ethnic minority of the Dutch to be socially uplifted to the standards of the Brit-
ish. The main institutional channels for this uplifting were affirmative action
policies in the public sector combined with the amplification of state activities
(Louw 2004). Thereby, class tensions within the two colonizing groups were
minimized to the detriment of the remaining groups, for whom class domination
and racism became intertwined (Wolpe 1990).
The racist ‘two nations project’ was further radicalized under apartheid
(1948-1994) and officially re-formulated into a ‘many nations project’. Follow-
ing Machiavelli’s guideline of ‘divide and conquer’, the apartheid regime fol-
lowed an ideology of ‘separateness’ (apartheid) of different ‘tribes’ while
fortifying racism: they tried to separate Africans along ethnic criteria, while fos-
tering policies to promote the Dutch vis á vis the British on the labor market
(Louw 2004). The constant aggravation of racism promoted the anti-apartheid
movement to grow stronger. The African National Congress had started off as a
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6 Forcefully imposed ‘migrant
labor’ on the Africans also had
important effects on gen-
der-related inequalities: While
African men were paid below
the subsistence rate of a whole
family, African women stay-
ing in the ‘reserves’ had to
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tence labor to compensate for
the missing men. The
‘super-exploitation’ of both
male and female Africans thus
contributed to higher profit
rates in the mining sector
(Wolpe 1980).
rather small movement of middle class Africans trying to promote their position
in the labor market. Under apartheid, it joined forces with the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and thereby shifted to the left. Nevertheless, the
strong unifying category was ‘race’, as freedom fighters categorized themselves
as ‘black’ – resisting the different racial and ethnic division criteria introduced
by the apartheid regime. The main target of their fight was institutionalized rac-
ism, albeit with different foci: liberals viewed racism as detrimental to capital-
ism, while socialists saw it as symbiotic; multiracialists wanted to abandon
racism, while Africanists wanted African supremacy. Common sense was the
demand for majority vote, regardless of race (Alexander 2002). Thus, not only
the regime, but also its main critics, organized around the notion of race.
In contrast, Brazilian capitalism could only develop as slavery was gradu-
ally abandoned throughout the 19th century. Despite the abolition of slavery,
most former slaves never had a chance to integrate into the newly emerging cap-
italist society and remained excluded, while European migration was promoted
to cope with labor shortages. Thereby, informal hierarchies and forms of social
exclusion were promoted and also politically institutionalized. The state emerg-
ing out of this scenario has been characterized as ‘patrimonial’ (Faoro 2001), as
personalism and paternalism were decisive (opposed to impersonal rights-
based bureaucratic procedures; cf. Weber 1980). In 1930, a coup d’état directed
by Getúlio Vargas countered patrimonialism and established a way of govern-
ing which was later described as ‘populism’ (Ferreira 2001; Weffort 1978):
marginalization continued to be a process affecting large groups of the popula-
tion, who had to work in the informal labor market. Thereby they were never
granted the same rights as the formal workers, who began to be granted social
and labor rights under Vargas, especially since the introduction of the minimum
wage and the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho between the end of the 1930s
and the beginning of the 1940s. This resulted in a division of workers, as the ma-
jority had to continue working in informal settlements, mostly on the country-
side, whilst the minority of mostly urbanized workers in the formal sector began
to be included. While a new utopia of ‘cidadania’ emerged, the unequal
institutionalization and societal structure remained. Vargas’ alliance with the
traditional ‘elites’ impeded further steps (Cardoso 2010). Contrary to South Af-
rica, a ‘one-nation project’ was envisioned, but not institutionalized as informa-
lization turned into the main dividing line between the included and the
excluded parts of the population (Leubolt 2013).
From the 1930s onwards, ‘developmentalism’ became the dominating dis-
course in Brazil, whereby development was equated with industrialization and
capitalist development. Liberal, conservative and ‘populist’ versions of this dis-
course differed in many aspects, but all viewed the state as the organizer of this
sort of development. Inequalities were largely covered by a ‘discourse of
non-existing violence’ (Chaui 1995), projecting harmony between the rich and
the poor and the non-existence of racism (Freyre 1992; Marx 2006). Therefore,
little importance was attached to the reduction of inequalities, except for some
developmentalist currents: ‘populists’ were in favor of including the formal sec-
tor of the working class via workers’ and social rights to prevent them from
striking and to promote social stability. More radical developmentalist currents
linked to the dependency school and/or socialism argued for a more thorough
inclusion of the hitherto marginalized. In their view, Brazilian inequalities hin-
dered the country to develop similar as European countries or the US, as a mass
market would never be able to develop thoroughly (Furtado 1963; Tavares
2000). Contrary to South Africa, the dominant discourse projected a ‘one nation
project’ of national unity with differences concerning the perception of the ac-
tual situation.
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Table 1 shows the periodization of the developments sketched out above
concerning South Africa, while Table 2, below, focuses on Brazil. In South Af-
rica, capitalism began to emerge out of ‘settler colonialism’. It was linked to
gold mining and represented an ethnically differentiated capitalism with the
British on top of the hierarchy. Tensions were most strongly voiced by the
Dutch labor movement, resulting in the establishment of ‘racist Fordism’7.
‘Racist Fordism’ was further radicalized by the apartheid regime which features
important continuities to the patterns of ‘racist Fordism’. By the end of the
1960s, ‘racist Fordism’ began to show symptoms of an economic crisis, as the
racist regulation of the labor market became more and more dysfunctional.
Mechanization in the still dominant mining sector demanded less unskilled but
more skilled and semi-skilled workers. As a result, liberal voices criticizing the
economic dysfunctionalities gained momentum – not only within the freedom
movement, but also within the power bloc, where critical voices by capitalists
grew stronger. Combined with increased international critique and economic
sanctions, this weakened the apartheid regime, which initiated the transition to a
non-racist regime, reacting to these critics and the pressure of the freedom fight-
ers, who continuously intensified their struggle from the 1970s onwards. De-
spite these favorable conditions for the progressive movement, the transition to
the post-apartheid regime was also marked by advantages for the adherents of
the apartheid regime. A very important factor in this respect was violence en-
acted by security forces and allies of the regime against Africans in the town-
ships. Therefore, Marais (2011, p.58ff.) diagnoses a ‘stalemate’ between the
ANC-led freedom fighters and the apartheid regime. Although the transforma-
tion to a non-racist regime began in the 1970s, it only gained substance with the
first general non-racist elections in 1994.
In contrast to apartheid in South Africa, the military dictatorship is usually
not given the same importance concerning Brazil’s periodization. Nevertheless,
a more fine-tuned periodization highlights the importance of the military dicta-
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Table 1 - Periodization, South Africa, from 17th century onwards
Period Phases
1652-1890 ‘settler colonialism’
1890-1923 Ethnically differentiated capitalism
1924-1970s ‘racist Fordism’
1948-1994 Apartheid Regime
Since 1970s Transformation to ‘non-racist capitalism’
Since 1994 Post-Apartheid Regime
Source: The author.
Table 2 - Periodization, Brazil, from 16th century onwards
Period Phases
1500-1850 Slavery-based patrimonialism
1850-1929 ‘Estate-based capitalism’ [capitalismo baseado em estamentos]
1930-1982 Developmentalism
1982-2006 Democratization and social reforms being counteracted by
neoliberal reforms, resulting in ‘inclusive liberalism’
2007-2014 New Developmentalism
Source: The author.
7 Gelb (1991) identified the
respective period as ‘racial
Fordism’. For the sake of this
paper, it seems to be more ap-
propriate to slightly modify
Gelb’s original idea to better
reflect the racist character of
the period.
torship that put an end to more radical equality-oriented politics originating out
of ‘populism’, aiming at the inclusion of the hitherto marginalized (Ferreira &
Delgado 2003; 2008). Important critical junctures in the period of ‘populism’
can be detected in 1954, when Vargas committed suicide to prevent the country
of a military coup d’état. This happened at a conjuncture of radicalization of the
‘populist’ project, at the period when the minimum wage reached one of its his-
toric peaks in real wage terms (cf. Graphic 1). The radicalization in the begin-
ning of the 1960s culminated in the proposals for ‘reformas de base’ under
president Goulart, which substantially included the hitherto marginalized for
the first time through proposals for a land reform. In the international context of
the cold war, the middle classes were mobilized against the alleged ‘commu-
nism’ stemming from the reforms and then largely supported the military coup
in 1964. Under the military dictatorship, the trend to implement more radical
equality-related policies was stopped, which is reflected in the drop and subse-
quent stagnation of the minimum wage from 1964 onwards (cf. Chart 1).
From the end of the 1970s onwards, symptoms of a deep economic crisis be-
gan to be visible and fuelled opposition to the regime. Besides the official oppo-
sition party, an autonomous and combative trade union movement (led by Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva) emerged and proved to be a decisive force against the re-
gime. Protests were geared against both authoritarianism and inequalities (espe-
cially concerning access and quality of public services and infrastructure). The
1980s can be seen as the time of a deep ‘organic’ crisis, as economic, social, po-
litical and cultural crises of the Brazilian state were interlinked. Therefore the
critical juncture resulted in profound changes on the economic and political
spheres that led to an end of the first period of developmentalism (Table 3).
The protests against the military dictatorship finally culminated in the par-
ticipatory drafting of a constitution that was finally ratified in 1988. Even
though the constitution included conservative claims against a thorough land re-
form, it also featured progressive claims, mainly in the field of social policies. A
discourse of ‘social citizenship’ (cidadanía, cf. Dagnino 1994) was decisive in
this regard, linking the claims for democracy and social justice. Institutionally,
its main impact was on the development of social policies: several social rights
were universalized – especially visible by the introduction of the Sistema Único
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de Saúde and the further universalization of the Brazilian pension system to in-
clude informal agricultural workers (IPEA 2009). Paradoxically, the far reach-
ing social reforms were not accompanied by tax reforms (Oliveira 2010),
impeding a thorough universalization of social policies (Santos & Gentil 2009).
The economy continued to be in crisis with hyper-inflation as its most important
expression. This can be viewed as an outcome of the correlations of forces: as
the claims of workers for higher wages enjoyed high legitimacy, the main reac-
tion of capitalists was to raise prices (Faria 1996). Thereby, class struggle was
‘mediated’ via inflation and could thereby be discursively transformed into a
technical problem, to be solved by competent administration by the state. This
can be seen as the beginning of the emergence of a ‘discourse of competence’
favoring technical solutions to intervene into societal conflicts (Chaui 2000).
IV. Transition to democracy and the current political conjuncture
As presented in the elaborations above, the South African historical heritage
differs from the Brazilian heritage in the important aspect of formalized racism,
structuring society for more than 70 years. Contrary to Brazil, where the domi-
nant discourse is rather centered on a ‘one-nation project’, South African dis-
course has historically been structured around the idea of a ‘two-nations
project’, albeit with different interpretations. Therefore, the possibilities for
constructing a ‘general interest’ (as the notion of ‘hegemony’ implies, cf.
Gramsci 1971) are much more limited. In contrast, the notion of ‘two nations’
made it easier for the equality-oriented movements to find common ground, as
they could construct a common identity as pertaining to the ‘black race’
(thereby also deconstructing attempts by the regime to divide the legally disad-
vantaged groups). Hence, racism could not be mystified as in the case of Brazil
and instead became the central target for equality-oriented claims. Furthermore,
the historical-institutional heritage of equality-oriented politics practiced by the
racist regimes has been marked by ambitious and (concerning the group of the
Dutch) successful programs of affirmative action. This heritage is clearly re-
flected in the current conjuncture concerning equality-related policies
(Table 4).
The period following the democratic transition and the landslide victory of
the ANC (obtaining 62.6% of the votes) in the first non-racist general election in
1994, was heavily influenced by the developments in the 1980s and early
1990s: the economic crisis beginning in the 1970s was aggravated by interna-
tional economic sanctions and the threat that capital could not come back to
South Africa or that further capital flight could occur. Furthermore, the high
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Table 3 - Periodization, Brazil, Developmentalism
1930-1945 1945-1964 1964-1985/88 1980s
‘Populism’ Military Dictatorship Democratization
Phases 1st Vargas government, in-
cluding Estado Novo
Democratic ‘Populism’ ‘Milagre Economico’
1967-1973; 1974/75 –
1985/88 state-led gradual
opening of the regime
Social movement activism
for Cidadanía resulting in
social reforms (Constitui-
ção Cidadã) against inter-
national ‘neoliberal tide’
Critical
Junctures
Rising civil society en-
gagement in the cities
1954 suicide of president
Vargas to prevent coup
d’état;1960s inclusion of
hitherto marginalized into
‘populist alliance’
Oil crisis of 1973 created
economic problems; 1978
begin of mass strikes in
São Paulo; Debt and infla-
tion crises of 1980s
Debt and inflation crises
Resistance by the ‘elites’
against social transforma-
tion
Source: The author.
level of violence fuelled fears that the country could be rendered ungovernable
(Marais 2001). With regard to these tendencies, the ANC led a government of
‘national unity’ together with the adherents of the old regime. Discourse in the
period centered on ‘peace and reconciliation’ and the project of a ‘rainbow na-
tion’ – the vision of a nation where people could live their racial and ethnic dif-
ferences in harmony with each other. To sustain this project, the government
attempted to introduce the abandoning of racism while avoiding too radical
measures that could foster social unrest and economic problems. Therefore,
radical transformations occurred in the political and legal spheres, where insti-
tutional racism was completely abandoned. Instead, universal social and labor
rights were introduced. A good example in the field of social policies is social
assistance, which was stratified according to the racial classification of recipi-
ents until 1994; ‘whites’ received much higher benefits than ‘blacks’. From
1994 onwards, everybody received equally high benefits. This form of univer-
salization of South African social policies was not accompanied by a substantial
amplification of tax collection. Therefore, new measures of ‘targeting’ had to be
applied and paid amounts had to be leveled down closer to the rates formerly
paid to ‘blacks’ (Seekings 2008). Therefore, the fiscal constraint impeded a se-
rious expansion of social policies (Leubolt 2014a).
Due to the negative heritage of apartheid education policies (Giliomee 2009;
Mgobozi 2004), equal rights mostly did not translate into better positions for the
formerly disadvantaged parts of the population in the labor market, as they were
mostly not sufficiently qualified (Buhlungu & Webster 2006). Apart from the
abandoning of explicit racist laws, active interventions into the labor market and
the economy were limited. Traditional claims of the freedom movement such as
the nationalization of strategic sectors in the economy were dismissed. Instead,
concerns about capital flight or its reluctance to invest in South Africa led to a
tight framework concerning state spending. Interestingly, neoliberal transfor-
mations were even accelerated, when the former apartheid party NP left the
‘government of national unity’ in 1996 and the GEAR strategy was introduced
(Hirsch 2005). Contrary to rhetoric claims, trade liberalization and the tight fis-
cal framework introduced by GEAR did not make the economy more dynamic
and led to further increasing rates of unemployment (Padayachee 2005). For
large parts of the formerly disadvantaged groups, the social situation deterio-
rated or stagnated at the low levels of the apartheid era. This created tensions,
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Table 4 - Periodization, South Africa, since 1994
1994-1998 1998-2008 Since 2008
Rainbow Nation African Renaissance New Africanism/Traditionalism
Period Focus on peace and reconcilia-
tion; avoidance of societal
conflict; ‘economic stability’
as Leitmotiv (e.g. GEAR);
Abandoning racist laws, but
little compensation for most
‘formerly disadvantaged’
Post-modern merging of
neoliberalism, leninism and
africanism; Discourse on “two nations”
focuses mostly on race and gives rise
to politics of Affirmative Action
Revival of traditions from the period of
‘the struggle’ merge with revival of
African traditionalism; Discursive shift
towards the “developmental state” with
little institutional and material backing
Critical
juncture
Lack of improvements for the
majority of the disadvantaged
population
Despite radicalized affirmative action
policies, still lack of improvements for
the majority of the disadvantaged pop-
ulation; rise of social movements; lack
of democracy within the governing al-
liance led to a change in political lead-
ership and discourse
2012 Marikana massacre: despite dis-
cursive shift away from
neoliberalism, still lacking improve-
ments for the majority of the disadvan-
taged population, leading to tensions
related to the issue of class politics, re-
flected within trade union movement
and the governing alliance
Source: The author.
which began to be prominently addressed by the then-vice president Mbeki in
his famous ‘two nations speech’ in 1998 (Mbeki 1998). In this speech, Mbeki
denounced the still existing inequalities between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ who
therefore still rather constituted two nations – the ‘white’ nation being rich, the
‘black’ remaining poor (Daniels 2006).
Mbeki’s ‘two nations discourse’ in the year before he was elected as presi-
dent indicates the attempts of the governing party to sustain the support by their
constituencies who were disappointed by the still existing lack of opportunities.
The Back Management Forum was a particularly powerful voice of criticism
against the dominance of ‘whites’ in the business sector. In reaction to these
criticisms the ANC set up an ‘empowerment commission’ in 1997, which pre-
sented its final report in 2001, which was the basis for the government’s strategy
of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE, cf. Jack & Harris 2007). These devel-
opments culminated in the government’s focus on affirmative action strategies
to promote the transformation of racist patterns in economy and society. While
beneficial to persons with close ties to the governing alliance of ANC, SACP
and Cosatu (Freund 2007), large parts of the formerly disadvantaged continued
to be excluded from the benefits of the program. Instead the strong incentives
for private companies to employ formerly disadvantaged people at the higher
tiers of management started to create tensions concerning the availability of
skilled personnel in both the public sector and the partner organizations in gov-
ernment.
Contrary to the developments concerning affirmative action policies, eco-
nomic policies were only slightly modified. Despite a newly emerging dis-
course advocating a ‘developmental state’ (Turok 2008), many pillars of neo-
liberal economic policies remained untouched (Terreblanche 2009). The
dominant discourse of the period can be largely attributed to South Africa’s
‘first post-modern president’ (Marais 2011, p.380) Mbeki, who framed a dis-
course of ‘African Renaissance’, which combined traditional African national-
ism and post-colonialism with a neoliberal understanding of ‘globalization’.
Mbeki tended to dismiss critics as people who do not understand the economy
sufficiently, which should instead be managed by a finance ministry (Treasury)
de-linking itself from political influences of the ANC and its alliance partners
and other state apparatuses (Calland 2006). While the equality-oriented policies
of this period already were much more successful in promoting some former
disadvantaged persons to higher levels in the professional hierarchies in both
public and private sectors, the majority of the (predominantly African) poor
were not able to improve. This is reflected in the worsening of the intra-racial
Gini coefficients among Africans from 0.54 in 1993 to 0.62 in 2008, while the
general Gini rose from 0.66 to 0.7 in the same timeframe (Leibbrandt et al.,
2010, p.32). Further rising rates of un- and under-employment led to a further
deterioration of income inequalities (SSA 2002; 2008). Social movements grew
stronger, fostering more or less radical criticisms on the shortcomings of the
government’s promises concerning service provision for the formerly disad-
vantaged groups in society, and most successfully on the government’s AIDS-
denialism (Marais 2010). As Mbeki’s leadership style was also authoritarian
and not dialogue-oriented, internal criticism within the government alliance
was rising. This set the stage for the dismissal of Mbeki as president of both the
ANC and government and created a positive opportunity structure for the rise of
a new project (Marais 2011).
Jacob Zuma was the person to profit from the newly created opportunity
structures (Pillay 2008; Southall & Daniel 2009), fashioning a new counter-dis-
course to the African Renaissance, presenting both elements of continuity and
rupture. The new elements concerned the discursive inclusion of important
parts of the left, who were given a much stronger voice internally. Official dis-
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course began to be geared towards discursive elements during the times of the
struggle against the apartheid regime than the post-modernist discourse popular
during the times of Mbeki’s presidency. While featuring some socialist ele-
ments, the Africanist discourse was also strengthened. The latter discourse has
also been reflected in the legal framework – most prominently in the Traditional
African Rights Bill, which strengthened the rights of traditional African leaders.
This bill has been discussed controversially and criticized for curtailing some of
the improvements laid down in the Post-Apartheid constitution, especially con-
cerning gender rights (Marais 2011, p.380ff.). Even some of the aspects of the
revival of radical socialist rhetoric have been debated controversially. A promi-
nent example was the discussion between SACP intellectual Jeremy Cronin and
(at those times) ANC-Youth League leader Julius Malema on the latter’s pro-
posal to nationalize the mines, which was criticized by the former as an attempt
to redistribute resources to his close fellows (SAPA 2009). Malema fashioned a
radical discourse promoting the interests of ‘blacks’ by radical reforms, most of
the proposals framed within the Africanist discourse. He has been criticized for
excessive patronage and promoting a new form of populism going beyond the
rhetoric already practiced by Zuma (Preez & Rossouw 2009). Malema has pre-
sented himself as a promising challenger of Zuma by the end of the 2000s, but
was finally suspended from the ANC for sowing divisions within the ANC and
hate speech in 2011. After that, he founded the party ‘Economic Freedom Fight-
ers’ to continue promoting his radicalized version of Africanist discourse.
Despite the new discourse featuring a rather post-neoliberal vision for soci-
ety, it was not capable to result in radical changes concerning the political econ-
omy of South Africa (Pons-Vignon & Segatti 2013). New criticism emerged
especially within the labor movement. An important event in this respect was
the Marikana massacre in 2012 (Alexander 2013), resulting from strikes of
mineworkers and internal divisions in the labor movement. In the end, the po-
lice forces shot 34 workers in an operation to end the strike. This has been diag-
nosed as a clear sign of a ‘transition towards violent democracy’ (Holdt 2013)
and also further contributed to already existing tensions within the labor move-
ment, where a more radical socialist discourse began to emerge. At the end of
2014, these divisions resulted in the expulsion of the left wing fraction orga-
nized in the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) from
the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). At this point, this
can be diagnosed as representing clear signs of a critical juncture. If this will re-
sult in radical transformations, it remains to be seen.
V. Comparing South African to Brazilian developments
The discourse emerging in the 1990s concerning economic policies resem-
bled the Brazilian discourse, as both presented economic policies as a matter of
applying the right technical solutions. Neoliberalism was presented as the best
technical solution to the economic crisis affecting the countries during the
1980s and 1990s, which would safeguard the countries from ‘populist solu-
tions’ leading to crisis and/or stagnation. Contrary to rhetoric claims, neither
economic growth could be substantially boosted, nor did the social situation of
the poor and marginalized improve significantly. Instead, unemployment
(and/or informality) rates increased substantially and income inequalities stag-
nated. In both countries, deteriorating working conditions and lacking improve-
ments of the situation of the poor generated new discourses and institutional
solutions, which differed substantially from each other: while South Africa was
marked by the emergence of an ‘anti-racism consensus’, an ‘anti-poverty con-
sensus’ manifested in Brazilian discourse. In Brazil the ‘anti-poverty consen-
sus’ had different facets since the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, a discourse of
‘inclusive liberalism’ appeared, emphasizing the limited capacities of the state
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which should therefore be targeted towards the poor, while the better-off should
seek for market solutions (Leubolt 2013). This discourse had its heydays by the
end of the 1990s and continued to be important until the mid-2000s, albeit with
important modifications after the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Ta-
ble 5).
Brazil recorded a more nuanced break with neoliberalism since 2007, when
the government introduced ‘new developmentalist’ policies, building on the
historical discourse of progressive developmentalism, which viewed margi-
nalization not only as a moral threat but also as a hindrance to foster economic
growth (due to the absence of a mass market capable of consuming the surplus
of goods produced in times of high economic growth). This resulted in a dis-
course of ‘inclusive developmentalism’ that was institutionalized in both social
and economic policies. The ambitious Brazilian Program for Accelerated Eco-
nomic Growth (PAC) included investments in social infrastructure on a large
scale, exemplifying this new approach towards development, linking ‘the eco-
nomic’ and ‘the social’ (Soares 2012). Thus, the Brazilian discourse of ‘social
developmentalism’ did not break with the historical heritage of the ‘discourse of
competence’, but substantially altered it, as investments to counter social in-
equalities were framed as investments in the economy. Contrary to South Af-
rica, income inequalities recorded a remarkable drop in recent years. Until
2010, relatively high rates of economic growth indicated success of the strategy
of ‘growth through redistribution’. With economic growth, the project of redis-
tributing wealth towards the poor was made substantially easier, as the sur-
pluses could primarily be transferred towards the poor without having to be
taken away from the better-off. From 2011 onwards, Brazil recorded rather
moderate economic growth rates. The financial crisis began to affect the coun-
try to a larger extent, as exports to China diminished and the virtuous circle of
boosting the economy by enabling the poor to consume was also affected due to
increased consumption of imported goods (Sicsú 2013).
In this context, a critical juncture seems to be emerging, as the middle
classes have begun to voice protest against the developments described above.
The year of 2013 saw mass manifestations on the streets, as Brazilians (mainly
from the middle classes) protested during the FIFA events (Singer 2014). The
‘anti-poverty consensus’ has weakened, especially among the better-off: data
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Table 5 - Periodization, Brazil, since 1990
‘Inclusive Liberalism’ New Developmentalism
1990-1994 1994-2002 2003-2006 2007-2014
Period Neoliberal reforms
(trade) countering
progressive consti-
tution
Neoliberal program of
inflation targeting
(Plano Real) ends infla-
tion; targeting in social
policies;
Continuing inflation tar-
geting; stop privatiza-
tions; less external de-
pendencies; expanding
social transfers (Bolsa
Família); rising mini-
mum wage
Rising state investments in pro-
gressive developmentalist politics
(growth through redistribution); at-
tempts to establish alliance be-
tween national bourgeoisie, work-
ers and marginalized
Critical
juncture
Hyper-inflation as
constant symptom
of economic crisis
Financial crises
1998/99 and 2002 re-
sulting in unemploy-
ment and
informalization
Criticism of continuation
of neoliberalism; Lula
wins 2nd election despite
‘Mensalão corruption
scandal’
Rising discontent of the upper mid-
dle classes due to relative loss of
status in society (linked to social
uplifting of the poor); Economic
problems, linked to international
conjuncture and problems to form
alliance with national bourgeoisie
Source: The author.
for 2010 (IPEA 2011) indicates that only 6.1% of the Brazilian population view
poverty and hunger as the central problem for Brazilian society, and an addi-
tional 5.8% view inequality as the central societal problem. Among the popula-
tion earning more than five minimum wages (MW), these numbers drop to
3.2% for inequalities, while poverty and hunger are no longer seen as central
problems in this societal group (0%). Compared to the year 2000, when 11% of
the Brazilian society and 7.6% of the Brazilian ‘elites’8 viewed poverty as the
central problem (Scalon 2007). Middle class discourse against redistribution is
still largely not voiced openly in public but rather channeled into issues compat-
ible with the ‘anti-poverty consensus’ such as corruption, preventing money to
be spent on public services: the access to quality schools (‘padrão FIFA’) was
already among the central demands during the protests of June 2013. Data for
2010 already indicated great differences in the perceptions of the rich (above
5 MW) and the poor (below MW): While 38.5% of the rich viewed low quality
education or non-access as central cause for poverty and a further 18.5% saw
corruption a major reason, only 15.4% of the rich saw unemployment as its cen-
tral reason. Meanwhile, 43.8% of the poor defined unemployment as central
reason and only 11.6% education, dropping to 9.6% for corruption. Therefore,
important critical voices against the discourse of ‘inclusive developmentalism’
seem to have emerged among the better-off in Brazil. The political climate be-
fore the elections of 2014 was further radicalized. After the very narrow victory
of Dilma Rousseff and continuing economic problems, there are signs that the
project of ‘inclusive developmentalism’ might be coming to an end.
VI. Conclusions: possibilities and limits for equality-oriented politics
The elaborations on discursive and institutional developments regarding
equality-oriented politics pointed at the context-dependency of the emergence
of such policies. The explicit racism of the South African inequality regime did
not only influence institutional developments, but also the equality-oriented
discourse emerging within the freedom movement. South African equality-ori-
entation is geared towards anti-racist politics and resulted in the emergence of
an ‘anti-racism consensus’ in the 1990s. The institutionalization of the dis-
course in policies was furthermore influenced by the policies carried out under
the apartheid regime in two important directions. Firstly, apartheid policies
were geared at the social uplifting of the Dutch vis á vis the British via affirma-
tive action policies, which could be viewed as archetypical South African equal-
ity-oriented policies. Secondly, apartheid education policies for the discrimi-
nated parts of the population were geared at producing a cheap low-skilled
workforce. This did not only create tensions since the 1970s, when the transfor-
mation of the mode of production changed the requirements of the labor market,
demanding a higher skilled workforce, but also resulted in problems in the
Post-Apartheid era: As there has been a growing importance of affirmative ac-
tion policies, private companies are heavily incentivized to employ formerly
disadvantaged people at all levels, including the middle and higher tiers of man-
agement. This resulted in a competition for a high-skilled ‘black’ workforce
which is scarce due to the continuing influence of the apartheid education sys-
tem. Therefore, capacity problems for both the public sector and the governing
tripartite alliance have been created, which are difficult to solve in the short run.
These problems are restricting possibilities to invest into social services, which
need sufficiently skilled personnel, especially in the field of education policies
(Picard 2005; Holdt 2010).
South African opportunity structures opened up possibilities to implement
one of the most ambitious affirmative action programs, benefitting not only Af-
ricans, but also other formerly discriminated people on the basis of race or gen-
der. This has opened up possibilities for social improvement that are not present
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8 Scalon’s (2007) definition of
‘elites’ differs from IPEA’s
definition, as she identified the
10% of survey respondents
with the highest incomes as
‘elites’.
in the case of Brazil. Contrary to the latter case, South African equality-oriented
policies did not succeed in reducing income inequalities, as possibilities for so-
cial uplifting are restricted to a rather small group of formerly disadvantaged
people who had sufficient access to education and the necessary social capital
(links to the governing tripartite alliance) to benefit from the affirmative action
program BEE. Critics also point out that the “emergence of a BEE-elite”
(Freund 2007) leads to the cooptation of former equality-oriented activists into
the inequality regime (Bond 2009). Despite the incorporation of some members
of the formerly disadvantaged groups into the upper echelons of society, South
Africa largely remains a ‘two nations project’ where it is difficult to frame an
equality-oriented discourse on a common interest.
In contrast, Brazil can resort to historical roots of such an equality-oriented
‘one nation discourse’, confronting the formal and informal institutional ‘two-
nations project’: ‘inclusive developmentalism’ has historically emerged as such
a discourse in the 1950s and has been rearticulated by the government alliance
in office until 2014. The strong focus on a ‘one nation project’ complicates to
bring up the issue of inequalities in a more radical way and can also be viewed
as the main reason for the reluctance to implement more nuanced anti-racist or
gender-related policies. Nevertheless, the success of Brazilian ‘inclusive
developmentalism’ in reducing income inequalities has been remarkable. It re-
mains yet to see if and how the current critical juncture related to lower rates of
economic growth and the dropping support by the middle classes can be over-
come.
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Resumo
O artigo foca a produção e reprodução das desigualdades sociais no Brasil e na África do Sul. O objetivo é interligar diferentes
perspectivas teóricas e aplicá-las a uma análise comparativa das políticas relacionadas à desigualdade. Lançando mão do
institucionalismo estratégico-relacional, são analisadas a herança histórica da formação discursiva e a institucionalização dos re-
gimes de desigualdade nos dois países, de modo a informar a análise da conjuntura mais recente. Enquanto a África do Sul é um
exemplo de discriminação racista formal, o regime de desigualdade do Brasil funcionou baseado em padrões mais informais. As
heranças históricas distintas influenciam o foco atual das políticas relacionadas à igualdade, as quais tendem a ser predo-
minantemente anti-racistas na África do Sul, enquanto no Brasil o foco foi reduzir da pobreza. A experiência brasileira tendeu mais ao
discurso de um “interesse comum” e foi mais capaz de institucionalizar as políticas para a redução das desigualdades de renda. A
África do Sul ainda é discursivamente dividida em “duas nações”. A ascensão social para os africanos ligados aos partidos governistas
foi apenas parcialmente acompanhada por melhores condições de vida para a maioria pobre dos africanos. Ambos os países são
significativamente estruturados pelas respectivas heranças históricas no que diz respeito tanto à criação como à redução das
desigualdades. O discurso de “uma nação” no Brasil foi mais bem sucedido em promover políticas relacionadas à igualdade em
comparação com o discurso de “duas nações” da África do Sul. A despeito de melhorias importantes, ambos os países se encontram
atualmente em conjunturas críticas e as contradições societais estão começando a criar novas tendências de crise.
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